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CRIMINAL LAW 
CONFRONTING COGNITIVE “ANCHORING 
EFFECT” AND “BLIND SPOT” BIASES IN 
FEDERAL SENTENCING:  
A MODEST SOLUTION FOR REFORMING A 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAW 
MARK W. BENNETT* 
Cognitive “anchoring effect” bias, especially related to numbers, like 
sentencing guidelines ranges, is widely recognized in cognitive psychology 
as an extremely robust and powerful heuristic.  It is a cognitive shortcut that 
has a strong tendency to undermine judgments by “anchoring” a judgment 
to an earlier disclosed number, the anchor.  Numerous studies prove 
anchoring bias produces systematic errors in judgment in wide-ranging 
circumstances, including judgments by experts—doctors, lawyers, real estate 
agents, psychologists, and auditors—as well as a variety of decisions by 
foreign and American federal and state judges.  The anchoring effect occurs 
even when the anchor is incomplete, inaccurate, irrelevant, implausible, or 
even random.  Roughly corresponding in time with the developing 
understanding of the anchoring effect, federal sentencing has undergone a 
revolution from judges having virtually unlimited discretion, to virtually no 
discretion, and back to considerable discretion, as the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines went from mandatory to advisory in a single monumental U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
Surprisingly, since judges were granted much greater discretion in Booker, 
the length and severity of federal sentences, for the most part, has not 
changed.  This remains true despite long-standing, persistent, and 
 
* Mark W. Bennett is in his twentieth year as a federal district court judge in the Northern 
District of Iowa, having sentenced more than 4,000 defendants, spanning four districts and 
two circuits, and is an even longer term adjunct professor at the Drake University School of 
Law.  The author is extremely grateful to Sarah French Russell for her insightful review of, 
and immensely helpful suggestions for, the earlier draft of this Article. 
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widespread dissatisfaction among federal district court judges with the 
Guidelines and the length of sentences.  This Article argues that this is 
because judges’ sentences are subconsciously anchored by the calculated 
Guidelines range.  This Article offers a simple, modest, and practical solution 
that requires no change in existing law by the Supreme Court or Congress.  
It simply requires rearranging the numerical anchoring information in the 
presentence report and adding additional relevant numerical information to 
counteract the anchoring effect of the Guidelines.  If federal district court 
judges are educated about the effect of cognitive anchoring and their own 
bias-based blind spots to it—their improved awareness can only enhance the 
fairness of sentencing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“God not only plays dice.  He also sometimes throws the dice where 
they cannot be seen.” 
—Stephen William Hawking1 
 
Trial judges, too, roll dice in sentencing.  They just do it unwittingly.  
Like God’s dice roll in Hawking’s quote above, judges’ dice rolls are never 
seen—except in one startling series of studies establishing that the actual 
number rolled on the dice, when disclosed to the judges, affected the length 
of sentences they gave!  For state and federal judges who sentence pursuant 
to advisory guidelines, there are potent psychological heuristics at play.  
“Psychologists have learned that human beings rely on mental shortcuts . . . 
‘heuristics,’ to make complex decisions.  Reliance on these heuristics . . . can 
also produce systematic errors in judgment. . . .  [C]ertain fact patterns can 
fool people’s judgment, leading them to believe things that are not really 
true.”2  These heuristics have a strong potential to affect the length of 
sentences.  Whether judges consider their sentencing philosophy to be tough, 
lenient, or in between, to be the best judges they can be, they need to 
recognize and understand how these cognitive and implicit forces tend to 
increase judges’ sentences without their conscious knowledge. 
This Article explores how judges’ hidden cognitive biases, specifically 
the “anchoring effect” and, to a lesser extent, the “bias blind spot,” impact 
the length of sentences they impose by subconsciously influencing judges to 
give greater weight to the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines than 
to other important sentencing factors.  Biologically, every mammalian eye 
has a scotoma in its field of vision—colloquially known as a blind spot.3  
Everyone, including sentencing judges, has blind spots.  This Article is not 
concerned with our scotomas, the physical blind spots of our eyes, but with 
their psychological corollary: the cognitive bias known as the “bias blind 
spot.”  This psychological blind spot prevents us from seeing our own 
cognitive biases, yet allows us to see them in others.4  This “tendency to see 
 
1 CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 460–61 (Alison Jones ed., 1996). 
2 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001) 
(citations omitted). 
3 As the authors of the new book, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People, note in their 
preface, all vertebrates have a blind spot in each of the retinas of their eyes.  MAHZARIN R. 
BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE, at xi 
(2013).  “This region, a scotoma (from the Greek word for darkness), has no light-sensitive 
cells and therefore light arriving at that spot has no path to the visual areas of your brain.  
Paradoxically, you can ‘see’ your own blind spot.”  Id. 
4 Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in 
Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681–82 (2005). 
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bias in others, while being blind to it in ourselves,” means that judges 
impacted by the anchoring effect in sentencing are unlikely to recognize it.5  
This creates a double bind for judges.  First, a lack of awareness prevents 
perception of the powerful and robust impact of the anchoring effect in 
sentencing.  Second, once one becomes aware of the anchoring effect, an 
inability to see how the anchoring effect impacts one’s own sentencing 
persists because of the “bias blind spot.”  “Moreover, to the extent that judges 
might consider themselves experts in the law, they are probably more 
confident of their abilities to disregard biases than they should be.”6 
Even more troubling, research indicates that sentencing judges are 
influenced by anchors, even irrelevant anchors, to the same extent as lay 
people and that the effects of the anchors are not reduced by the judges’ actual 
experience.7  Compounding this conundrum is that while more experienced 
judges are equally susceptible to the effects of anchoring as novices, they 
“feel more certain about their judgments.”8  That is why it is critically 
important for sentencing judges, probation officers who prepare presentence 
reports, and practicing lawyers to understand the potential robust and 
powerful anchoring effect of advisory Guidelines and the effect of the “bias 
blind spot” in determining just sentences. 
In the last quarter century, federal sentencing has undergone enormous 
upheaval: from unbridled discretion to sentence as low as probation up to the 
statutory maximum, to the mandatory and inflexible United States 
Sentencing Guidelines—the grin-and-bear-it approach to sentencing9—to 
advisory Guidelines with the return of significant, but not unbridled 
discretion.  Shockingly, given the substantial judicial displeasure and even 
hostility toward the Guidelines, the return of substantial discretion has not 
significantly altered the length of most defendants’ sentences.  I suggest that 
this is due primarily to the anchoring effect.  Computing the advisory 
 
5 Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The 
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
565, 565 (2007).  Pronin and Kugler provide a fascinating explanation as to why people 
possess a “bias blind spot,” a subject beyond the reach of this Article. 
6 Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and Dress Codes, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 303 (2007). 
7 Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant 
Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 
197 (2006).  “Experienced criminal judges who have worked on many related cases and have 
made many related sentencing decisions were still influenced by a sentencing demand that was 
determined by throwing a set of dice.”  Id. 
8 Id. at 198. 
9 The sentencing table, or grid, of the United States Sentencing Guidelines contains 258 
cells, each containing a sentencing range.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, 
sentencing tbl. (2012).  
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Guideline range so early in the sentencing process strongly anchors a judge’s 
sentence to that range, or close to it.  This is true even when compelling 
factors suggest a significantly lower or, on rare occasions, higher sentence.10 
This Article is organized as follows.  Part I comprehensively examines 
the anchoring effect in a variety of intriguing settings through the lens of 
classic cognitive anchoring studies.  Part II focuses on cognitive anchoring 
studies in several judicial contexts that involve actual judges, including some 
from Germany, but mostly federal and state court judges in the United States.  
Together, these first Parts provide a more thorough and in-depth analysis of 
the robustness of the anchoring effect than any prior scholarship discussing 
judges and anchoring. 
Part III presents an overview of the federal sentencing revolution, from 
the implementation of the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines in 
1987 through the Booker11 and Gall12 shockwaves arising from the 
Apprendi13 upheaval leading to the now-advisory Guidelines.  These advisory 
Guidelines restore substantial, but not unlimited, sentencing discretion.  Part 
IV examines the statistical trends of federal sentencing, showing that the 
Guidelines, even in their current advisory role, continue to exert a strong 
gravitational pull on federal sentencing.  This Part also explains that the result 
of this pull is that very little has changed in terms of the length of federal 
judges’ sentences, even with their new, broad discretion.  Part V argues that 
the most likely culprit as to why federal district court judges have remained 
so tethered to the Guidelines, post Booker and Gall, despite their wide 
dissatisfaction with them, is the anchoring effect. 
Part VI offers a modest, sententious but meaningful and straightforward 
proposal to help reduce the undesirable anchoring effect of the Guidelines.  
The proposal reorders the information in the presentence report (PSR) 
prepared by the U.S. Probation Office in every federal sentencing.  Rather 
than disclosing the often complex Sentencing Guidelines calculations early 
in the PSR (where the anchoring effect comes in), the information about the 
defendant’s personal history and other factors that a judge must consider and 
may use to vary downward or upward from the Guidelines would be 
disclosed first.  The judge could then note on the PSR a preliminary 
 
10 Upward variances occur with great infrequency.  For example, in fiscal year 2011, of 
the 76,216 defendants sentenced that the USSC received sufficient information to analyze, 
only 1.9% received an above-Guidelines-range sentence, while 18.6% received a non-
government sponsored, below-range sentence.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE 
CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING pt. C, at 13–17 
(2012), available at http://goo.gl/f6HmIH. 
11 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
12 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
13 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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sentencing range based on everything the judge is required to consider 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and reach a tentative sentencing range before 
the PSR discloses the advisory Guidelines sentencing range.  This reordering 
would greatly help in reducing the anchoring effect of the Guidelines.  The 
judge would first have to confront why the initial sentencing range he or she 
wrote down, unencumbered by the actual computed Guidelines range, was 
different.  The judge would then decide if the gravitational pull of the 
Guidelines unfairly influenced his or her § 3553(a) analysis or vice versa.  
Also, other highly relevant numerical sentencing information not currently 
included in the PSR should be presented in the latter portions of the PSR to 
counteract the anchoring effect of the Guidelines.  Unlike prior unrealistic 
proposals offered by law professors to reduce the effect of anchoring in 
federal sentencing,14 this proposal requires no further action by the U.S. 
Supreme Court or Congress and is easily implemented by any federal district 
court judge that chooses to adopt this recommendation. 
I. THE POWER AND ROBUSTNESS OF THE “ANCHORING EFFECT” 
A. BACKGROUND 
Virtually all judges strive to be as fair and rational as possible when 
sentencing.  But what if there are hidden psychological processes quietly at 
work that undermine their best efforts to be fair?  Psychologists label such 
processes “cognitive biases.”15  These biases—which can lead to serious 
mistakes in decisionmaking, judgment, and reasoning—can cause judges to 
hold on to certain preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary, persuasive 
information.16 
 
14 See Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case Against 
Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same In Light of Gall, Kimbrough, 
and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 150 (2008) 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court could “take the steps to do away with the Guidelines 
calculation requirement”); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS 
L.J. 423, 463 (2013) (arguing that the courts should consider the Guidelines “midstream” in 
sentencing procedures but recognizing this is contrary to Supreme Court sentencing 
requirements). 
15 Cory S. Clements, Comment, Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation: 
Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words, 2013 BYU L. REV. 
319, 334 (“Phenomena studied in social psychology and cognitive science, cognitive biases 
are common mistakes and predispositions in mental processing that affect people’s beliefs and 
understandings of the world.”). 
16 The precise number of identified cognitive biases is uncertain, but one online source 
lists ninety-three types of cognitive biases, from “[a]mbiguity effect” to “[z]ero-sum 
heuristic.”  List of Cognitive Biases, WIKIPEDIA, http://goo.gl/5ECRMB (last updated Feb. 12, 
2014, 11:18 AM).  Often, more than one cognitive bias is at play.  See, e.g., Michael A. 
McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics 
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Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the human tendency to 
adjust judgments or assessments higher or lower based on previously 
disclosed external information—the “anchor.”17  Studies demonstrate “that 
decisionmakers tend to focus their attention on the anchor value and to adjust 
insufficiently to account for new information.”18  Cognitive psychology 
teaches that the anchoring effect potentially impacts a huge range of 
judgments people make.  This includes people who have developed expertise 
in their fields, like experienced real estate agents,19 auto mechanics,20 and 
physicians.21  In discussing cognitive biases among specialized experts, 
Jeffrey Rachlinski and his colleagues observe: “Research on some experts—
including doctors, real estate agents, psychologists, auditors, lawyers, and 
judges—shows that they often make the same kinds of mistakes the rest of 
us make.”22  Amazingly, repeated studies show that the “anchor” produces 
an effect on judgment or assessment even when the anchor is incomplete, 
inaccurate, irrelevant, implausible, or random.  When it comes to numbers, 
“[o]verwhelming psychological research demonstrates that people estimate 
or evaluate numbers by ‘anchoring’ on a preliminary number and then 
adjusting, usually inadequately, from the initial anchor.”23  Without a 
thorough and comprehensive understanding of anchoring studies, it is nearly 
impossible to grasp the full impact of the anchoring effect on sentencing 
under an advisory Guidelines regime. 
B. THE COGNITIVE “ANCHORING EFFECT” STUDIES 
In the 1970s, the notion of cognitive biases was first noted by cognitive 
psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman and reported in their 
 
Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459 (2006) (considering the following 
cognitive biases: framing effects, confirmation bias, optimism bias, hindsight bias, the 
anchoring effect, and endowment effects at work when professional athletes consider contract 
offers); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 
(2006) (considering anchoring, framing, and omission bias in bankruptcy judges’ decisions). 
17 Todd McElroy & Keith Dowd, Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects: How Openness-to-
Experience Influences Responses to Anchoring Cues, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 48, 
48 (2007). 
18 Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 602–03 (2003). 
19 Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects 
in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1536–37 (2001). 
20 Id. 
21 Noel T. Brewer et al., The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on the Judgments and 
Choices of Doctors and Patients, MED. DECISION MAKING, Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 203, 208. 
22 Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1229–30 (footnotes omitted). 
23 Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 201 (2007). 
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classic work, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.24  In one 
of their studies described in that work, which “is often seen as the classic 
anchoring study,”25 Tversky and Kahneman asked the study participants 
questions about the percentage of African nations in the United Nations.26  
The participants were asked if the percentage of African nations was higher 
or lower than an arbitrary number (the anchor), which they selected by 
spinning a wheel of fortune before them.27  After the wheel landed, for 
example, on the number 10, the participants were asked if the percentage of 
African nations was higher or lower than 10.28  They were then asked what 
their best judgment was as to the percentage of African nations in the United 
Nations.29  Participants given the number 10 anchor gave median averages of 
25%, while those given the number 65 anchor gave median averages of 
45%.30  The anchoring effect occurred even though the anchors selected and 
known to the participants were random and bore no rational relationship to 
the judgment. 
In February 2013, I conducted a similar anchoring test while conducting 
a training session in Dallas on implicit bias for lawyers in the Leadership 
Academy of the Torts, Trial, and Insurance Practice Section of the American 
Bar Association.  Half the lawyers were asked in writing if Texas, at its 
widest point, was narrower or wider than 820 miles.  The other half were 
asked the same question, but the “anchor” changed to 420 miles.  Each lawyer 
only saw one anchor, either 820 or 420 miles, on the written sheet before him 
or her and had no idea what, if any, number/“anchor” the others received.  
The lawyers, none of whom were from Texas, were then asked to write down 
how wide they thought Texas was at its widest point.  The lawyers given the 
 
24 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).  Kahneman went on to win the Nobel Prize 
in 2002 for his work in behavioral economics.  See Alex Stein, Book Review, Are People 
Probabilistically Challenged?, 111 MICH. L. REV. 855, 855 (2013) (reviewing DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)); The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://goo.gl/6kix5Q (last visited 
May 22, 2014). 
25 Thomas Mussweiler, The Malleability of Anchoring Effects, 49 EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 67, 68 (2002). 
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420 mile anchor judged the width of Texas to be 59% shorter than the lawyers 
given the 820 mile anchor.31  The actual width of Texas is 773 miles.32 
In yet another series of anchoring studies, participants were asked “how 
thick a piece of paper would be if it were folded in on itself 100 times.”33  
The results?  “Only rarely do people give estimates larger than a few yards 
or meters, yet the correct answer, given an initial sheet of paper 0.1 millimeter 
thick, is roughly 1.27 x 1023 kilometers—more than 800,000,000,000,000 
times the distance between the earth and the sun!”34  Few get anywhere near 
this answer “because they begin by imagining the first few folds (a very low 
anchor) and do not adjust their estimate upward sufficiently for the doubling 
effect of later folds.”35 
The next anchoring study is important because it demonstrates the 
power of anchoring in a real world setting and also establishes that 
professionals with specialized expertise are not immune to the power of 
anchoring.36  In a classic study of real estate prices, dozens of real estate 
agents in the Tucson, Arizona area, after touring two houses and receiving 
the standard ten-page packet of information, were asked to give their best 
estimates of: (1) the appraised value, (2) the appropriate selling price, (3) “a 
reasonable price to pay for the house,” and (4) the lowest offer they would 
accept if they were the seller.37  All the agents received the same information, 
except the listing price: some received a listing price 11% to 12% above the 
appraised value, some 11% to 12% below the appraised value, some 4% 
below, and some 4% above.38  As can be seen in Figure 1, “the agents 
consistently saw the listing price as too high (regardless of what the listing 
price was) and all four estimates showed significant evidence of anchoring.  
Interestingly, however, when asked what their top three considerations were 
 
31 In February 2013, I replicated this anchoring study with eleven Drake University School 
of Law students in my Employment Discrimination Litigation class.  The results were nearly 
identical to those in Dallas.  This was true even with the much smaller sample size.  The data 
for both studies is on file with the author. 
32 See, e.g., Tex. State Historical Ass’n, Environment, TEX. ALMANAC, 
http://goo.gl/DzZ8CP (last visited May 22, 2014) (“The greatest east-west distance is 773 
miles from the extreme eastward bend in the Sabine River in Newton County to the extreme 
western bulge of the Rio Grande just above El Paso.”). 
33 SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 149 (1993). 
34 Id. (“The correct answer can be found by multiplying the thickness of the paper (0.1 
millimeter) by the total number of layers (2100).  This number works out to be 1.27 x 1029 
millimeters, or 1.27 x 1023 kilometers.”). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 148–49. 
37 Id. at 148. 
38 Id. 
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in making these judgments, only 1 agent in 10 mentioned the listing price.”39  
This is because anchoring works at the subconscious level. 
 
Figure 1 













$119,900 $114,204 $117,745 $111,454 $111,136 
$129,900 $126,772 $127,836 $123,209 $122,254 
$139,900 $125,041 $128,530 $124,653 $121,884 
$149,900 $128,754 $130,981 $127,318 $123,818 
 
What about the effect of arbitrary anchors in unrelated tasks?  In an 
anchoring experiment conducted by Timothy Wilson and his colleagues, 
participants were asked to copy either five pages of numbers ranging from 
4,421 to 4,579; four pages of random words and one page of four-digit 
numbers; or five pages of random words.41  They were then asked to estimate 
the number of current students at the University of Virginia who will contract 
cancer in the next forty years.42  The participants who copied the five pages 
of numbers estimated the number of incidences of cancer to be substantially 
higher than the group that copied one page of numbers, and that group was 
higher (although not significantly so) than the group who copied no 
numbers.43  Figure 2 summarizes the results of this study.  Thus, the 
anchoring effect occurs even when the arbitrary anchor is presented in an 
unrelated preceding task.44  Interestingly, the participants gave low estimates 
when asked how much the anchor influenced their answers, but gave higher 
estimates for others being influenced.45  In fact, 86% reported the anchor had 
“no effect” on their answers.46  The authors concluded that “[t]hese results 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 149 tbl.13.1 (citation omitted). 
41 Thomas Mussweiler et al., Anchoring Effect, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON 
FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 183, 188 (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 
2004) (citing Timothy D. Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring 
and Its Antecedents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 387 (1996)). 
42 Id. 
43 Wilson et al., supra note 41, at 394.  
44 Id. at 394–95; see also Mussweiler et al., supra note 41, at 183–200. 
45 Wilson et al., supra note 41, at 395. 
46 Id. at 394. 
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are consistent with the assumption that anchoring effects are unintentional 
and nonconscious . . . .”47 
 
Figure 2 
Ratings of the Number of Students Who Will Get Cancer in the Next 
Forty Years as a Function of the Anchoring Condition48 
 
 
The anchoring effect impacts judgments, even when the anchor is 
extreme.  In a study conducted by Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack, 
participants were asked if Mahatma Gandhi was “older or younger than either 
140 years or 9 years” at the time of his death.49  Participants, who received 
the high anchor, 140 years, estimated on average that Gandhi lived to the age 
of 67 years.50  Participants, who received the lower anchor, 9 years, estimated 
on average that Gandhi lived to the age of 50.51  The authors concluded, 
“[T]he consideration of what is clearly an impossible state of affairs (i.e., 
Gandhi having reached the age of 9 or 140 years) strongly influenced 
subsequent judgments.”52 
Thus, stunningly, the anchoring effect occurs even when the anchor is 
ludicrous or implausible.  In another study, college students provided a higher 
 
47 Id. at 395. 
48 Id. at 395 fig.4 (modified form). 
49 Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Considering the Impossible: Explaining the Effects 
















No Numbers 1 Page of Numbers 5 Pages of Numbers
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estimate of the average cost of a college textbook when they were first asked 
if it was higher or lower than $7,128.53.53  In a different study, people 
provided higher estimates of the average annual temperature in San Francisco 
when first asked if it was higher or lower than 558 degrees.54 
Importantly, the anchoring effect is greater when the anchor is plausible 
rather than implausible.55  In another study conducted by Mussweiler and 
Strack, the participants were asked about the average annual mean 
temperature in the Antarctic: “Is the annual mean temperature in the 
Antarctic higher or lower than X°C?” and, “How high is the annual mean 
temperature in the Antarctic?”56  Two implausible anchors were used: 700°C 
and 900°C.57  Two plausible anchors were also used: -17°C and -3°C.58  The 
actual mean temperature in the Antarctic was -68°C.59  The plausible anchors 
were established from another set of similarly situated participants who were 
simply asked, “How high is the annual mean temperature in the Antarctic?”60  
The plausible temperatures used in the actual study were based on one 
standard deviation above the mean for the high anchor (-17°C) and one 
standard deviation below the mean for the low anchor (-43°C) from the 
pretest group.61  The implausible low anchor (700°C) “was about 56 standard 
deviations above the mean” of the pretest group and the “high implausible 
anchor (900°C) was about 72 standard deviations above” the pretest group.62  
“Thus, the difference between the two implausible anchors was about 8 times 
that between the two plausible anchors.  For each participant the critical 
comparative anchoring question contained one of these four anchors.”63  The 
results of the study are summarized in Figure 3.  Analysis of Figure 3 reveals 
that while there was a much greater difference between the two implausible 
anchors (700°C v. 900°C) than the two plausible anchors (-17°C v. -43°C), 
“the difference in the resulting absolute estimates was much larger for the 
plausible than the implausible anchors.”64 
 
53 Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 788 & n.53 (citing PLOUS, supra note 33, at 146). 
54 Id. at 788–89 (citing PLOUS, supra note 33, at 146). 
55 See generally Mussweiler & Strack, supra note 49. 








64 Id. at 154.  To verify this conclusion, Mussweiler and Strack replicated the study in 
principle in a second study, a knock-off of their earlier Mahatma Gandhi study, using two 
plausible anchors (61 and 86 years) and two implausible anchors (214 and 271 years).  The 
Gandhi study results supported the Antarctic study conclusion.  Id. at 155–56. 
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Figure 3 
Absolute Estimates for the Annual Mean Temperature in the Antarctic by 
Anchor and Plausibility65 
Anchor 
PLAUSIBILITY 
Plausible Implausible  
High -24.84 (SD = 16.36) -24.44 (SD = 18.58) 
Low -41.12 (SD = 16.79) -23.27 (SD = 13.83) 
 
Many studies have observed that anchoring also influences the 
outcomes of mock civil jury verdicts.66  In one study, researchers found that 
the amount of money requested by the plaintiff’s lawyer for damages in a 
personal injury case directly anchored the amount of damages awarded by 
the mock jurors.67  The mock jurors received the exact same set of facts about 
the plaintiff’s injury, except the amount requested by the plaintiff’s lawyer 
was different, and the mock jurors were told the request was either $100,000; 
$300,000; $500,000; or $700,000.68  As Figure 4 indicates, the more the 
plaintiff’s lawyer requested, the more the mock jurors awarded in damages 
to the plaintiff. 
 
Figure 4 
Effects of Requesting Different Damage  
Amounts in Personal Injury Trials69 








65 Id. at 154. 
66 Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New 
Insights from Meta-analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 605 n.43 (2006) (citing 
numerous studies). 
67 Id. at 606; see also John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects 
of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 
495 (1989). 
68 Malouff & Schutte, supra note 67, at 495. 
69 Id. 
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Dan Orr and Chris Guthrie conducted the first meta-analysis70 of the 
effect of anchoring with an opening number or demand in negotiations to 
measure the impact of these first numbers on outcomes and to “assess how 
potent this phenomenon is.”71  The authors concluded that the “meta-analysis 
demonstrates that anchoring has a powerful impact on negotiation.”72  
However, Orr and Guthrie also concluded that anchoring “has a less 
pronounced—though still quite substantial—impact in circumstances where 
the recipient of the anchor is an experienced negotiator and where the 
recipient possesses a rich body of information containing competing anchor 
points.”73  The authors also noted that “[a]nchoring can be pernicious in 
court,” leading to “serving an inappropriately long sentence in jail.”74 
In summary, the anchoring effect heuristic has been repeatedly 
confirmed in a multitude of cognitive bias studies since Tversky and 
Kahneman first wrote about it in 1974.  Virtually all cognitive psychologists 
agree that previous research on anchoring has shown this heuristic to be a 
robust psychological phenomenon ubiquitous across many domains of 
human judgment and decisionmaking.75  Assessments and judgments are 
affected by “anchors,” even when the anchors are incomplete, inaccurate, 
irrelevant, implausible, or random.76  Of critical significance for this Article 
 
70 “Meta-analysis” is defined as “a quantitative statistical analysis of several separate but 
similar experiments or studies in order to test the pooled data for statistical significance.”  
Meta-analysis – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://goo.gl/vRyibT (last 
visited May 22, 2014). 
71 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 66, at 598. 
72 Id. at 624. 
73 Id. at 628. 
74 Id. at 608. 
75 See Mussweiler et al., supra note 41, at 196. 
76 In general, four theoretical accounts or mechanisms of anchoring have been proposed: 
(1) insufficient adjustment from a starting point, (2) conversational inferences, (3) numeric 
priming, and (4) selective accessibility.  Id. at 189.  Surprisingly, there is little consensus 
among cognitive experts as to the precise theoretical models for how the anchoring effect 
actually works in a given situation.  See, e.g., Mussweiler et al., supra note 41, at 196 (“The 
various paradigms that have been used to examine anchoring effects, however, appear to differ 
with respect to the additional mechanisms they may involve.  With a perspective on 
psychological processes rather than judgemental effects, we may well find that what has 
previously been considered as instantiations of one judgemental heuristic called ‘anchoring’ 
is actually a conglomeration of fairly diverse phenomena whose similarity rests solely on the 
net outcome they produce.”); Brewer et al., supra note 21, at 210–11 (“The anchoring bias has 
presented longstanding fascination for those in the field of judgment and decision making.  
The present findings suggest that irrelevant anchors may have more complex effects than 
initially thought, particularly when the bias extends from judgment to choice.  Models of the 
anchoring bias may require refinement to better reflect such findings.”); Mussweiler & Strack, 
supra note 49, at 146 (“Although such effects of implausible anchors are well documented in 
the literature . . . little is known about the psychological mechanisms that produce them.”); 
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are the findings that the more plausible the anchor, the greater the effect it 
has on distorting assessment and judgment.  Scott Plous, after discussing 
many of the anchoring studies mentioned above, concludes “[t]he effects of 
anchoring are pervasive and extremely robust.  More than a dozen studies 
point in the same direction: People adjust insufficiently from anchor values, 
regardless of whether the judgment concerns the chances of nuclear war, the 
value of a house, or any number of other topics.”77  Or, in the case of 
sentencing, judges adjust insufficiently from the anchoring effect of the 
advisory Guidelines range where the judgment concerns length of sentence. 
II. JUDGES AND THE ANCHORING EFFECT 
Are judges somehow immune to the anchoring effect?  One might think 
that by virtue of our education, training, and experience in assessing and 
judging evidence and facts we might be.  A plethora of empirical studies 
establish that cognitive biases, sometimes including anchoring, infect the 
judgments of professionals, including doctors, lawyers, accountants, real 
estate appraisers, option traders, psychologists, military leaders, and 
engineers.78  In three recent studies, one of federal magistrate judges 
(generalist judges),79 one of federal bankruptcy judges (specialist judges),80 
and the third involving both state and federal judges,81 the authors found each 
group of judges susceptible to strong anchoring effects.  Before turning to 
these studies in some detail, a brief look at a series of studies about judges in 
Germany confirming the existence of the anchoring effect in sentencing is in 
order. 
A. THE GERMAN JUDGES STUDIES 
A series of studies using German judges sheds light on the effect of 
anchoring in determining the length of sentences.82  In one such study, 
researchers found that anchoring influenced the length of a sentence in a rape 
case.83  The researchers presented German criminal trial court judges with a 
 
Mussweiler, supra note 25, at 71 (“These findings appear to be inconsistent with a numeric 
priming account of anchoring . . . .”). 
77 PLOUS, supra note 33, at 151. 
78 Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 782–83 (footnotes omitted). 
79 Id. at 786–92. 
80 Rachlinski et al., supra note 16. 
81 Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty 
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
82 Englich et al., supra note 7, at 190–93; Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 19, at 1538–
41. 
83 Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 19, at 1538–41. 
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lengthy vignette of a rape case.84  The participating judges were assigned one 
of two conditions: in the first group, the judges learned that the prosecutor 
had requested a two-month sentence for the defendant, and the second group 
was told that the prosecutor had requested a sentence of thirty-four months.85  
The judges exposed to the higher anchor (thirty-four months) increased their 
average sentences by more than 50%.86 
Another German judge study using real judges in a mock sentencing 
scenario found that the judges were influenced by the anchor number given 
by a news reporter in an unexpected telephone call where the reporter asked: 
“Do you think that the sentence for the defendant in this case will be higher 
or lower than [1 or 3] year(s)?”87  Half the judges were exposed to the low 
anchor (one year) and half to the high anchor (three years).88  The judges 
were requested not to answer the reporter’s question.89  The participants 
given the low anchor imposed an average sentence of 25.43 months, and 
those exposed to the high anchor gave an average sentence of 33.38 months.90  
The participants in the study were both prosecutors and judges, and there was 
no difference in the data.91 
The lead author of these and other studies of German judges’ criminal 
sentencing practices, Birte Englich, observes: “In general, judicial sentencing 
decisions should be guided by facts and not by chance.  Disconcertingly, 
however, several studies have shown that sentencing decisions—even those 
made by experienced legal professionals—are influenced by demands that 
are blatantly determined at random.”92  Englich notes that: “Converging 
evidence suggests that judicial decisions may indeed be influenced by 
anchors.”93  Englich further observes that several studies demonstrate, in the 
criminal context, that real judges’ sentences were strongly influenced by the 
prosecutors’ sentencing suggestions, even when the suggestions were 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1540. 
86 Id. 




91 Id.  Some of the participants in the studies “were junior lawyers from different German 
courts who had recently received their law degree[s] and had acquired their first experiences 
as judges in court.”  Id. at 194.  In “the German system of legal education, judges and 
prosecutors receive identical training and alternate between both positions in the first years of 
professional practice.”  Id. at 190. 
92 Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the 
Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 L. & POL’Y 497, 498 (2006) 
(citation omitted); see also Englich et al., supra note 7. 
93 Englich, supra note 92, at 500. 
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random.94  In one of the studies, conducted by Englich, Mussweiler, and 
Strack, the judges were specifically told that the prosecutor’s sentencing 
suggestion was determined at random.95  Two related studies “went even 
further to ensure that sentencing demands [by the prosecutors] were clearly 
irrelevant.”96  Using this loaded die, the judges selected the sentencing 
demands of the prosecutors themselves.97  “Even though this procedure 
ensured that [the] participants were aware of the irrelevance of the sentencing 
demands, their sentencing decisions were dramatically influenced by 
them.”98  This remained true even among experienced judges.99 
When “junior lawyers” were substituted for more experienced judges, 
the only difference in the sentencing outcomes was that “experienced judges 
in these studies felt much more certain about their—equally biased—
judgments.”100  Englich observed not only the anchoring effect on German 
judges but the “blind spot” bias—the tendency to believe that one’s own 
judgments are less biased than others.101  This research demonstrates “that 
judgmental anchoring has a strong influence on criminal sentencing 
decisions.”102  There is no reason to believe that American judges are immune 
from blind spot bias.  This bias makes it challenging for judges who are aware 
of the anchoring effect in sentencing to admit that it affects their sentencing 
as well as that of their colleagues. 
The results of the German judge studies are troubling.  The legal 
professionals studied had “received extensive training in the critical 
judgment domain, had considerable experience in making similar sentencing 
decisions, and were motivated to provide an accurate judgment.”103  
However, disturbingly, “they were [still] influenced by random numbers 
even if they determined these numbers themselves by throwing dice.”104  
Moreover, these studies “are the first to demonstrate that expert judgments 
are influenced by clearly irrelevant anchors.”105  More concerning, not only 
for sentencing judges but also for appellate judges who review appealed 
sentences, “the present findings demonstrate that whereas experts are as 
 
94 Id. passim; see also Englich et al., supra note 7. 




99 Englich, supra note 92, at 500. 
100 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
101 See Ehrlinger et al., supra note 4, at 681. 
102 Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 19, at 1547. 
103 Englich et al., supra note 7, at 198. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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susceptible to anchoring influences as novices, they feel more certain about 
their judgments.”106  As Englich, Mussweiler, and Strack note in their 
opening quote by Albert Einstein, “God does not play dice with the 
universe.”107  But the German studies establish that the anchoring effect in 
sentencing decisions should make all judges pause to consider if we are 
unknowingly playing dice. 
B. THE AMERICAN JUDGES STUDIES 
In two empirical studies of sitting federal judges in the United States, 
magistrate judges, and bankruptcy judges, and a third of state and federal 
judges, researchers found that these judges, too, were susceptible to the 
anchoring effect in their judicial decisions.108  Guthrie and his colleagues 
observed: “Judges, it seems, are human.  Like the rest of us, they use 
heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment.  Unlike the rest of 
us, however, judges’ judgments can compromise the quality of justice that 
the courts deliver.”109 
1. The U.S. Magistrate Judges Study 
The study of U.S. magistrate judges110 looked at whether five cognitive 
biases—“anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 188. 
108 Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 784–85 (focusing on U.S. magistrate judges); Rachlinski 
et al., supra note 16, at 1230 (focusing on U.S. bankruptcy judges); Wistrich et al., supra note 
81, at 1259. 
109 Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 821 (internal footnote omitted). 
110 Congress created the office of the United States magistrate judge in 1968.  Federal 
Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107–19 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 631–39 (2012)).  The Federal Magistrates Act authorizes magistrate judges to 
conduct misdemeanor trials with the consent of the litigants, to serve as special masters in civil 
matters, and to assist district judges with pretrial and post-trial functions and “additional duties 
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(a)(5), (b)(1)–(b)(3) (2012); see also Magistrate Judgeships, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://goo.gl/eYbvcO (last visited May 22, 2014).  After several congressional amendments, 
the role of the magistrate judge has greatly expanded.  See Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges, 
Article III, and the Power to Preside over Federal Prisoner Section 2255 Proceedings, 2002 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 6.  Magistrate judges have authority to conduct habeas proceedings, 
subject to district court review, and to conduct civil trials with the consent of the litigants.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C) (2012); see also Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary 
(Literally and Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 
IND. L.J. 823, 877 (2012).  “For the 12 month period ending September 30, 2010, Magistrate 
Judges performed 353,847 judicial duties in civil cases, . . . including 169,134 [pretrial] 
motions, 20,515 settlement conferences, and 52,322 other pretrial conferences.”  About Us, 
FED. MAGISTRATE JUDGES ASS’N, http://goo.gl/woa8TM (last visited May 22, 2014).  
Magistrate judges “also performed 186,337 felony pretrial duties, including 98,115 motions, 
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and egocentric biases[—]would influence the decision[s] . . . of a sample of 
167 federal magistrate judges.”111  For the purposes of this Article, I focus 
primarily on the anchoring results.  In the study, while attending an annual 
conference, 167 judges were each presented with a written description of a 
hypothetical personal injury suit in which the amount of damages was the 
only issue, the parties had waived a jury, and the parties were asked to award 
the amount of damages they thought appropriate.112  The judges were 
randomly assigned either an “anchor” or “no anchor” condition.113 The “no 
anchor” group received only a hypothetical laying out the facts.114  They were 
then simply asked, “How much would you award the plaintiff in 
compensatory damages?”115  The “anchor” group received the same 
hypothetical but was also given the anchor condition that “[t]he defendant 
has moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that it does not meet the 
jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case of $75,000.”116  The “anchor” 
group was then asked to rule on the motion and was told, “If you deny the 
motion, how much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory 
damages?”117  The authors explain: “Because the plaintiff clearly had 
 
38,921 pretrial conferences, and 2,222 evidentiary hearings.”  Id.  During this period, 
“Magistrate Judges terminated 12,470 civil cases with litigants’ consent . . . [and] Magistrate 
Judges conducted 333 civil jury trials and 171 civil trials without jury.”  Id.  In this twelve-
month period, “Magistrate Judges submitted 21,385 recommended dispositions in prisoner 
cases (habeas corpus and civil rights),” and they “completed 4,225 reports and 
recommendations in social security appeals.”  Id.  Magistrate judges are Article I judicial 
officers who are appointed by a majority vote of the district judges of each district court to 
serve in a United States district court for a renewable term of eight years.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 631(a), (e).  In 2011, there were 527 full-time magistrate judge positions, as well as 41 part-
time magistrate judges, and 3 combination clerk-of-court/magistrate judges.  About Us, FED. 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES ASS’N, supra. 
111 Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 778.  The sample of 167 magistrate judges represented 
about one-third of the 519 magistrate judges then serving.  Id. at 787. 
112 Id. at 790–91.  The judges were given the following hypothetical: 
Suppose that you are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit that is in federal court based on 
diversity jurisdiction.  The defendant is a major company in the package delivery business.  The 
plaintiff was badly injured after being struck by one of the defendant’s trucks when its brakes 
failed at a traffic light.  Subsequent investigations revealed that the braking system on the truck 
was faulty, and that the truck had not been properly maintained by the defendant.  The plaintiff 
was hospitalized for several months, and has been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his 
legs.  He had been earning a good living as a free-lance electrician and had built up a steady base 
of loyal customers.  The plaintiff has requested damages for lost wages, hospitalization, and pain 
and suffering, but has not specified an amount.  Both parties have waived their rights to a jury trial. 
Id. at 790. 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  For the full text of the hypothetical, see supra note 112. 
115 Id. at 790–91. 
116 Id. at 791. 
117 Id. 
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incurred damages greater than $75,000, the motion was meritless.  
Nevertheless, we hypothesized that the $75,000 would serve as an anchor, 
resulting in lower damage awards from those judges who first ruled on the 
motion.”118 
Indeed, the anchor of ruling on the meritless motion “had a large effect 
on [the] damage awards.”119  The judges in the “no anchor” group awarded 
the plaintiff an average of $1,249,000, while the judges in the “anchor” group 
awarded an average of $882,000.120  “[A]sking the judges to rule on [the] 
frivolous motion [to dismiss (the “anchor” group)] depressed average 
damage awards by more than $350,000 (or 29.4%).”121  Because damage 
award data presented by a mean award can be skewed by a few large awards, 
the authors also presented the data by median and quartile statistics, here 
duplicated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 










No Anchor $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,925,000 
Anchor $288,000 $882,000 $1,000,000 
 
From Figure 5, the authors noted that the motion to dismiss in the 
“[a]nchor” group “had a pronounced effect on the judges at all response 
levels.”123  Interestingly, for purposes of this Article, Guthrie and colleagues 
pontificated that “[t]he potentially pernicious effects of anchoring also 
suggest a source of error in both the civil and criminal justice systems.”124 
2. The U.S. Bankruptcy Judges Study 
After studying magistrate judges, Guthrie and colleagues proceeded to 
study bankruptcy judges.125  The primary purpose of this study was to look 





121 Id. at 792. 
122 Id. at 792 tbl.1. 
123 Id. at 792. 
124 Id. at 793. 
125 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1227, 1230. 
126 Id. at 1228–30. 
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Generalist trial judges can breathe a huge sigh of relief;127 for the purposes of 
this Article, I focus on the bankruptcy judges study’s look at the anchoring 
effect on their judgments (although the study took into account several 
heuristics).128  Like the magistrate judge study, the 113 bankruptcy judges in 
the study were recruited at one of their annual seminars in 2004.129 
To test the influence of the cognitive bias of anchoring on bankruptcy 
judges, the authors constructed a “Truck Driver” problem.130  The problem 
asked the bankruptcy judges “to set an interest rate on a restructured loan in 
a Chapter 13 proceeding” based on the then-recent Supreme Court ruling in 
Till v. SCS Credit Corp.131  In Till, the Court rejected a creditor’s argument 
that the 21% interest rate on the current loan should be the presumptive rate 
on the restructured loan.132  Instead, the Court adopted the debtor’s view that 
the current prime rate adjusted for the debtor’s greater risk of default should 
be used.133 
The bankruptcy judges participating in the Truck Driver problem were 
assigned randomly, unbeknownst to them, to either a “control” group with no 
anchor or an “anchor” group.134  The judges in the control group were 
informed that the parties in the Truck Driver problem agreed under Till that 
the “original contract interest rate is irrelevant to the court’s 
determination.”135  The judges in the “anchor” group received the same 
sentence, but the words “of 21%” were inserted between the words “rate” and 
“is irrelevant.”136  All judges in both groups were then asked to set the 
restructured loan interest rate.137  Specifically, they were all asked: “Because 
the parties disagree on the appropriate annual interest rate, it is up to you to 
select one.  What annual interest rate would you select?”138 
The authors of the study “found that the initial interest rate affected 
judges’ assessments.”139  The judges in the “control” group set a mean 
interest rate of 6.33%, while the judges in the “anchor” group set a mean 
 
127 Id. at 1230–31, 1257. 
128 Id. at 1233–37. 
129 Id. at 1231. 
130 Id. at 1233. 
131 541 U.S. 465 (2004); Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1233. 
132 Till, 541 U.S. at 478–80; Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1233. 
133 Till, 541 U.S. at 478–80; Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1233–34. 
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interest rate .8% higher at 7.13%.140  The authors concluded that because 
some judges merely selected the prime rate with no adjustments, the effect of 
the anchoring was understated.141  With those judges removed, the difference 
became almost 1.5%.142  Both the 0.8% and 1.5% were statistically 
significant, and while the difference might seem small, the authors noted that 
even this difference on a modest loan of $10,000 dollars “can mean hundreds 
or even thousands of dollars over the life of the loan.”143 
The authors then compared their results with the results of the magistrate 
judges study, using comparative standard deviations for the anchoring and 
varying exercises between the magistrate and bankruptcy judges.144  The 
magnitude of the anchoring effect was similar but slightly smaller for the 
bankruptcy judges, and the authors observed: “we cannot conclude from this 
that bankruptcy judges are less susceptible than generalist judges to the 
anchoring effect.”145 
3. One Final Anchoring Study—Information Obtained in Settlement 
Conferences 
The same authors of the two previous studies also conducted a third 
judicial study, which in part looks at the role of anchoring in settlement 
discussions with judges.146  The data collected on this part of the study came 
from judges attending five different judicial education conferences.147  
Portions of the study examined whether judges were influenced or 
“anchored” by inadmissible information (i.e., the monetary demand by 
plaintiff’s counsel in a settlement conference) when the same judge later was 
asked to decide the amount of damages to be awarded at trial.148  The judges 
were presented with an “Assessment of Damages” scenario involving “a 31-






144 Id. at 1237. 
145 Id.  The authors did find something of interest in their demographic data: “Republican 
judges were more likely than their Democratic counterparts to make decisions that favored 
creditors.”  Id. at 1258.  However, political party affiliation did not affect susceptibility to the 
anchoring effect.  Id. at 1257–58. 
146 Wistrich et al., supra note 81, at 1286. 
147 Id. at 1279, 1285 tbl.1.  In the study, 62 magistrate judges came from conferences in 
either San Diego or Minneapolis; 71 state trial court judges came from a large urban court 
(they were promised the identity of the jurisdiction would not be revealed); and 105 state trial 
court judges came from Maricopa County, Arizona.  Id. at 1279–80.  For more demographic 
information about the judges in the study and the study procedures, see id. at 1279–89. 
148 Id. at 1286. 
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driven by one of the defendant’s employees.”149  The materials indicated that 
the judge agreed to hold a last-minute settlement conference on the eve of 
trial, but the conference was unsuccessful, so the case proceeded to trial.150  
Judges in the control group did not receive a specific dollar request from 
plaintiff’s counsel in materials describing the settlement conference, while 
the other judges learned that plaintiff’s counsel had demanded either 
$175,000 (the low anchor) or $10,000,000 (the high anchor) to settle.151 
The judges with the low anchor awarded a mean of $612,000, while the 
judges in the matched control group awarded a mean award of nearly 
$1,400,000; the judges with the high anchor awarded a mean award over 
$2,200,000, while the judges in the matched control group awarded a mean 
award of $808,000.152  Thus, the “low anchor” group produced a mean award 
56.29% lower than the matched control group and the “high anchor” group 
produced a mean award 172.28% greater than the matched control group.  
The authors concluded: “The anchors appear to have influenced the judges’ 
assessments of the appropriate amount of damages to award.  Relative to the 
judges assigned to the control conditions, the high-anchor judges gave 
substantially higher awards and the low-anchor judges gave substantially 
lower awards.”153  Here, the powerful effects of the high and low anchors, 
derived using anchors that are at least relevant to the judges’ assessments 
about the amount of damages, are “in contrast to the anchors that 
psychologists typically provide in their studies of anchoring . . . .”154 
4. Summary of Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” Studies 
The studies of judges—German, American, experienced, generalist, and 
specialist—clearly establish that judges, like the general population, are 
strongly impacted by the anchoring effect.  This remains true even with 
random and unrelated anchors, like the effect of rolling dice on the length of 
sentences.  When related and plausible anchors are used, the gravitational 
pull of the anchors is even stronger and has a greater effect on judges’ 
assessments and judgments.  Before turning to the anchoring effect and 
sentencing under the current advisory Guidelines regime, the next part of this 
Article provides a brief overview of federal sentencing. 
 
149 Id. at 1288. 
150 Id. at 1288–89. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1289–90. 
153 Id. at 1291. 
154 Id. 
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III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING REVOLUTION 
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
In its new report to Congress on the impact of United States v. Booker,155 
the United States Sentencing Commission’s (USSC) “sentencing data 
analyses spanned a broad time frame, from October 1995 through September 
2011.”156  This data spanned four periods: “the Koon period (June 13, 1996 
through April 30, 2003), the PROTECT Act period (May 1, 2003 through 
June 24, 2004), the Booker period (January 12, 2005 through December 10, 
2007), and the Gall period (December 11, 2007 through September 30, 
2011).”157  The Commission chose these periods because they reflected 
“Supreme Court decisions and legislation that influenced federal sentencing 
in fundamental ways.”158  The latter two periods, Booker and Gall, are 
particularly important because they reflect the current state of federal 
sentencing and are thus described in greater detail. 
Characterizing the first period, the Supreme Court in Koon v. United 
States established that district court departure decisions under the Guidelines 
were entitled to deference on appeal by adopting an abuse of discretion 
standard of review and rejecting a de novo standard.159  The second period 
referred to by the USSC is the PROTECT Act period.  In 2003, Congress 
enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation 
of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act)160—which restricted the use of 
departures by sentencing courts and changed the standard of review for 
departures to de novo.161  However, looking at important USSC data spanning 
 
155 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. A. 
156 Id. at 2. 
157 Id. at 2–3. 
158 Id. at 3.  The Commission describes these four periods as follows: 
Specifically, in United States v. Koon, the Supreme Court defined the level of deference due to 
district courts’ decisions to sentence outside the guideline range and determined that such decisions 
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  In passing the PROTECT Act nearly seven years later, 
Congress restricted district courts’ discretion to impose sentences outside the guideline range, and 
required that courts of appeals review such decisions de novo, or without any deference to the 
district court’s decision.  In Booker, the Supreme Court struck down two statutory provisions in 
the SRA that made the guidelines mandatory, and also defined the standard of review for sentences 
on appeal.  In Gall v. United States, the Court further defined the appellate standard of review. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
159 518 U.S. 81, 96–100 (1996). 
160 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
161 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. A. 
The PROTECT Act included several directives to the Commission, among them a directive to 
promulgate guideline amendments “to ensure that the incidence of downward departures are [sic] 
substantially reduced.”  The Commission responded to these directives and statutory changes with 
two amendments implementing the PROTECT Act’s direct amendments to the guidelines and an 
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all four periods is essential to understand the nature and gravitational pull of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as cognitive anchors for sentencing 
judges. 
B. THE BOOKER REVOLUTION 
For nearly a decade, federal sentencing law has been in a period of 
fundamental and “profound change.”162  The so-called Booker163 revolution 
marked the Maginot line between the mandatory sentencing guideline regime 
(in place since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) went into effect on 
November 1, 1987)164 and the new post-Booker advisory Guideline 
sentencing scheme.165  Booker, in short, held the Sentencing Guidelines 
 
eight-part emergency amendment that modified nine guideline provisions.  The amendment also 
created the early disposition departure (or “fast track”) called for in the PROTECT Act at §[ ]5K3.1 
(Early Disposition Programs) (Policy Statement) and a new guideline at §[ ]1A3.1 (Authority) 
setting forth the statutory authority for the Commission and the guidelines.  The amendments’ 
overall effect was to limit the availability of departures by prohibiting certain factors as grounds 
for departure, restricting the availability of certain departures, narrowing when certain permitted 
departures were appropriate, and limiting the extent of departures.   
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
162 Scott Michelman & Jay Rorty, Doing Kimbrough Justice: Implementing Policy 
Disagreements with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1083, 1083 
(2012). 
163 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
164 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION 2 (n.d.), available at http://goo.gl/z6c5bE. (last visited May 22, 
2014). 
165 Actually, the seeds of the post-Booker sentencing revolution were sown in the 
somewhat obscure case of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).  In Jones, the Supreme 
Court interpreted a federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988), to define three 
separate offenses rather than a single offense with potentially three different maximum 
sentences triggered by aggravating factors that were not found by a jury.  Id. at 251–52.  This 
interpretation avoided the potential due process and Sixth Amendment constitutional issues 
identified by the Court.  Id. at 239–52.  The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court answered the question raised, but not decided, in Jones 
and held: 
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely, 
confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones.  Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 490.  Then, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court extended the 
Apprendi rationale to invalidate a state mandatory sentencing regime because the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited a state sentencing judge from enhancing a criminal 
sentence three years above the fifty-three-month maximum sentence based on facts not 
decided by a jury or admitted by a defendant, in this case, that Ralph Howard Blakely acted 
with deliberate cruelty.  Id. at 298, 313–14.  Blakely, thus, refined the Apprendi rule by 
holding: 
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unconstitutional under the Apprendi-Blakely rationale because the sentencing 
judge enhanced Freddie Booker’s sentence beyond the 262-month sentence 
he could have imposed (based on facts the jury found beyond a reasonable 
doubt) to 360 months based on facts the judge found by a preponderance of 
the evidence.166  The Booker remedy did two things.  First, it severed and 
excised the provision of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory and 
binding on federal judges, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).167  The Court noted that 
had Congress made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than 
mandatory, the SRA would fall “outside the scope of Apprendi’s 
requirement.”168  Second, the Court severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), 
which “sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of 
departures from the applicable Guidelines range.”169  Thus, Booker made 
clear that mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by jury by extending the Court’s prior holdings in Apprendi and Blakely to 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.170  Thus, the Court answered the 
first question presented in the case—“Whether the Sixth Amendment is 
violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a 
fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted 
by the defendant”171—in the affirmative.  The second part of Booker, the 
remedial portion, held that the proper remedy for the Sixth Amendment 
violation was to make the Guidelines advisory by severing two provisions 
that made the Guidelines mandatory.172 
C. THE POST-BOOKER SENTENCING REGIME 
Booker clearly gave federal sentencing judges more discretion, but not 
much clarity on how to apply the § 3553(a) factors.  “Mandatory Guideline 
sentencing was out.  The seven factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (§ 3553 
 
In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional 
findings.  When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury 
has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” and the judge 
exceeds his proper authority. 
Id. at 303–04 (citation omitted).  “Blakely made Booker’s constitutional holding all but 
inevitable . . . .”  Michelman & Rorty, supra note 162, at 1093. 
166 Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 243–44. 
167 Id. at 258–59. 
168 Id. at 259. 
169 Id. (citation omitted). 
170 Id. at 243–44. 
171 Id. at 229 n.1. 
172 Id. at 245. 
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factors) were in.”173  The Court in Rita v. United States described the § 3553 
factors as: 
That provision tells the sentencing judge to consider (1) offense and offender 
characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing, 
namely, (a) “just punishment” (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) 
rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) 
Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted 
disparities; and (7) the need for restitution.174 
Additionally, Rita reinforces that the § 3553 factors also mandate “the 
sentencing judge to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with’ the basic aims of sentencing as set out above.”175 
The central issue in Rita was whether a presumption of reasonableness, 
adopted by several federal courts of appeals as part of their post-Booker 
“reasonableness” review, attached to a sentence on appeal that was within the 
Sentencing Guidelines.176  The Court held that the courts of appeals were free 
to adopt a presumption of reasonableness in part because by the time they 
review “a within-Guidelines sentence[,] . . . both the sentencing judge and 
the [USSC]  will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence 
in the particular case.  That double determination significantly increases the 
likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”177  The Court noted: “We 
repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption.  
Given our explanation in Booker that appellate ‘reasonableness’ review 
merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion, the presumption 
applies only on appellate review.”178 
But is that how sentencing judges have implemented Booker?  Justice 
Stephen Breyer, the author of the majority opinion in Rita, wondered as 
much: “Rita may be correct that the presumption will encourage sentencing 
judges to impose Guideline sentences.”179  Justice John Paul Stevens, 
concurring in Rita, candidly recognized that “I am not blind to the fact that, 
as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines 
as virtually mandatory after our decision in Booker.”180  In his Rita 
concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, who was in the majority on the 
Booker holding that the mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment, but dissented as to the Booker remedy, noted: “The only way to 
 
173 Michelman & Rorty, supra note 162, at 1095. 
174 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007). 
175 Id. at 348. 
176 Id. at 341. 
177 Id. at 347. 
178 Id. at 351. 
179 Id. at 354. 
180 Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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assure district courts that they can deviate from the advisory Guidelines, and 
to ensure that judge-found facts are never legally essential to the sentence, is 
to prohibit appellate courts from reviewing the substantive sentencing 
choices made by district courts.”181  Finally, even Justice David Souter in his 
Rita dissent expressed grave concerns about district court judges’ 
“substantial gravitational pull” to the now-advisory Guidelines.182  Justice 
Souter warned that “a presumption of Guidelines reasonableness would tend 
to produce Guidelines sentences almost as regularly as mandatory Guidelines 
had done” and that this “would open the door to undermining Apprendi itself, 
and this is what has happened today.”183  Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Souter 
raised these very concerns without explicitly considering the powerful 
evidence of the anchoring effect! 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF GALL V. UNITED STATES 
In Gall v. United States, the Court reversed the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision, which had in turn reversed the trial 
court judge for varying from the bottom of the Guidelines range of thirty 
months to probation.184  The trial court judge, in fashioning the sentence, 
relied on the facts that Gall was a recent college graduate, who several years 
earlier had voluntarily withdrawn from his limited seven-month involvement 
in an ecstasy drug trafficking conspiracy, started his own successful business, 
lacked a criminal history, and had the support of his family and friends.185  
The Court took serious issue with the Eighth Circuit’s view that a sentence 
outside the advisory Guidelines range must be supported by justifications that 
are proportional to the extent of the variance.186  The Court also rejected the 
Eighth Circuit’s view that the thirty-month variance at issue was 
“extraordinary” and must be supported by extraordinary circumstances.187  
The Court held that neither of the Eighth Circuit’s views was consistent with 
the Court’s remedial opinion in Booker.188  The Court held: 
[W]hile the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended 
Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—
whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a 
 
181 Id. at 373 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
182 Id. at 390 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. 
184 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). 
185 Id. at 43–46. 
186 Id. at 45–53. 
187 Id. at 46–48. 
188 Id. at 46–49. 
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deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  We also hold that the sentence imposed by the 
experienced District Judge in this case was reasonable.189 
The Court explained: “If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the 
appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of 
reasonableness.”190  Critically, the Court held that “if the sentence is outside 
the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of 
unreasonableness.”191  Moreover, even “[t]he fact that the appellate court 
might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is 
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”192 
The Court also explained that trial court judges are “in a superior 
position to find facts,” determine the credibility of the witnesses, apply the 
§ 3553(a) factors, and “gain[] insights not conveyed by the record.”193  
Quoting from its earlier opinion in Koon, the Court emphasized the historic 
role of a federal sentencing judge: “It has been uniform and constant in the 
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted 
person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings 
that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment 
to ensue.”194  The Court further observed, “[I]t is not for the Court of Appeals 
to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the 
sentence reasonable.”195  Rather, under the more deferential “abuse-of-
discretion review, the Court of Appeals should have given due deference to 
the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the §[ ]3553(a) 
factors, on the whole, justified the sentence.”196 
Thus, Gall gave federal sentencing judges wider discretion to apply the 
§ 3553(a) factors and to achieve the overarching principle of federal 
sentencing that every federal district court judge “shall impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of 
sentencing.197 
 
189 Id. at 41. 
190 Id. at 51. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of Federal Public & Community Defenders & National 
Ass’n of Federal Defenders in Support of Petitioner at 16, Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (No. 06-7949)). 
194 Id. at 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). 
195 Id. at 59. 
196 Id. at 59–60. 
197 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
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E. THE PRE-SENTENCING AND SENTENCING PROCESS 
After a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury or judge in a 
trial, the U.S. Probation Office prepares a presentence report (PSR).198  The 
requirements for the presentence investigation and the preparation of the PSR 
are contained in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The 
key provisions of the Rule require the probation officer to apply and compute 
the advisory Guidelines range by calculating the defendant’s offense level 
and criminal history, stating the resulting sentencing range, and identifying 
all relevant sentencing factors, including the defendant’s history, 
characteristics, and any prior criminal record.199  The PSR is then disclosed 
to the parties,200 and they are given time to object in writing to anything in 
the PSR, including the calculation and proposed advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines range.201  At sentencing, the judge resolves any contested advisory 
Guidelines or fact issues, takes any evidence, and hears any witnesses offered 
by the parties.202  Before imposing a sentence, the judge must allow both the 
defense attorney and the attorney for the government an opportunity to be 
heard and “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant 
to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence . . . .”203 
The Supreme Court in Gall described the proper procedure for post-
Booker sentencing.204  First, “a district court should begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”205  
The Guidelines ranges are contained in a sentencing table or grid consisting 
of “43 offense levels on a vertical axis and 6 criminal history categories on a 
horizontal axis that intersect to form a sentencing grid with 258 cells that 
each contain an advisory guideline sentencing range, except for the 6 cells 
for offense level 43 that have a single sentence: life.”206  The judge then 
should give “both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they 
deem appropriate . . . .”207  Next, “the district judge should then consider all 
 
198 The percentage of defendants who plead guilty has remained constant over the years: 
the Koon period was 95.0%; the PROTECT Act period was 95.4%; the Booker period was 
95.3%; and the Gall period until 2011 was 96.5%.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, 
pt. A, at 58. 
199 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). 
200 Id. 32(e). 
201 Id. 32(f). 
202 Id. 32(i). 
203 Id. 32(i)(2)–(4). 
204 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). 
205 Id. at 49. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007)). 
206 United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 n.1 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (Bennett, 
J.) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.). 
207 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. 
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of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .”208  The judge “must make an individualized 
assessment based on the facts presented.”209  If the judge “decides that an 
outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the 
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to 
support the degree of the variance.”210  Finally, the judge “must adequately 
explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to 
promote the perception of fair sentencing.”211 
IV. POST-BOOKER SENTENCING AND THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF THE 
GUIDELINES RANGE 
Were Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Souter’s concerns correct in Rita that 
an appellate presumption of reasonableness would create a gravitational pull 
towards the now-advisory Guidelines so that federal judges would sentence 
just like they had when the Guidelines were mandatory?  In discussing that 
gravitational pull, one scholar and policy analyst suggested that “the 
guidelines’ recommendation serves as a psychological ‘anchor,’ which 
appears to simplify or obviate the daunting task of evaluating the seriousness 
of the offense, the dangerousness of the offender, and other considerations 
relevant to the statutory purposes.”212  The scholar notes, “It is no surprise 
that judges would be grateful for a recommendation that purports to take into 
account the difficult considerations that bear on sentencing.”213  Thus, like 
wearing old shoes or old blue jeans, judges may just feel more comfortable 
relying on the Guidelines.  Does anchoring by the actual Sentencing 
Guidelines range either discourage or minimize the extent of applying the 
other § 3553(a) factors and downward variances? 
 
208 Id. at 49–50. 
209 Id. at 50. 
210 Id. 
211 Id.  Contra Amy Baron-Evans & Thomas W. Hillier, II, The Commission’s Legislative 
Agenda to Restore Mandatory Guidelines, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 293 (2013) (scathingly 
discussing the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2010 promulgation of its three-step Guideline, 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010), allegedly incorporating the holding 
of Gall).  This blistering analysis establishes that this new Guideline is totally inconsistent 
with Gall, and contrary to the claim by the Commission, it is also inconsistent with all of the 
holdings of the courts of appeals and likely unconstitutional.  See generally id. 
212 Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”: Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal 
Guidelines, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 689 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
213 Id.  Yet another reason for the gravitational pull of the Guidelines is the standard in 
some circuits that within-Guidelines sentences require a lesser explanation by the sentencing 
judge than a sentence outside the Guidelines range.  See, e.g., United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 
984, 990–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 331 n.36 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
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In looking at very recent and comprehensive data from the USSC, 
presented here in Figure 6, it is fascinating to observe how little the increased 
discretion of federal district court judges post-Booker and Gall has impacted 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































214 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. C (citation omitted). 
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The gravitational pull of the Guidelines appears to be so strong that the 
change from mandatory to advisory Guidelines has had little to no impact on 
the average length of federal sentences.  Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, the 
average sentence for all federal sentences imposed215 in the Koon era was 
forty-nine months,216 while the average sentence for all federal sentences 
imposed217 in the Gall era is also forty-nine months.218  The average non-
government sponsored, below range sentence in the Koon era was thirty-two 
months, while the average during the Gall era actually increased by 68% to 
forty-seven months.219  The average non-government sponsored, below-
range sentence occurred 15.4% of the time in the Koon era and increased to 
only 17.4% in the Gall era.220  Finally, if judges were actually consistently 
exercising discretion using the § 3553(a) factors to vary downward, one 
would expect to see a substantial increase in the average extent of reductions 
for non-government sponsored, below-range sentences for all offenses from 
the Koon era to the Gall era.  However, the actual average extent of 
reductions was more modest.  The average percent reduction and number of 
months reduced in the Koon era was 41.8% and seventeen months; in the 
PROTECT Act era 40.0% and seventeen months; in the Booker era 39.1% 
and twenty months; and in the Gall era 40.7% and twenty-one months.221  
Thus, the impact of the greater discretion given federal judges under Booker 
and Gall has only minimally affected non-Guidelines sentencing.  As the 
D.C. Circuit has observed, “It is hardly surprising that most federal sentences 
fall within Guidelines ranges even after Booker—indeed, the actual impact 
of Booker on sentencing has been minor.”222 
As Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate, the post-Booker broadening of judicial 
discretion has had virtually no impact on mitigating the harshness of 
sentencing under advisory Guidelines rather than mandatory Guidelines.  The 
average sentence imposed in terms of months compared to the average 
Guidelines minimum has remained virtually constant from the Koon period 
through the Gall period. 
 
215 Id. at 81. 
216 Id. at 19. 
217 Id. at 81. 




222 United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 1 tbl.1 (2008); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL 
SENTENCING 57 (2006)). 
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Figure 7 
Average Guideline Minimum and Sentence Imposed 





Percent Difference Between Average Guidelines Minimum  
and Sentence Imposed, All Offense, Fiscal Years 1996–2011224 
 
 
223 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. C (citation omitted). 
224 Id. 
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Legal scholars have also recognized the marginal impact of Booker on 
the length of sentences.225  Ryan Scott has observed that the expected post-
Booker revolution “did not prompt immediate changes in sentencing 
outcomes.”226  In fact, the average length of sentences, even in drug 
trafficking offenses, increased for several years post-Booker.227  Scott 
concluded: “The rate of below-guideline sentencing jumped, but quickly 
leveled out, and the change was hardly ‘earth-shattering.’  Many 
commentators lamented that, far from ushering in a revolution, the decision 
turned out to be a dud.”228  I now turn to the most likely explanation for this 
post-Booker dud. 
V. ANCHORING AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
It is hardly surprising that the United States Sentencing Guidelines still 
act as a hulking anchor for most judges.229  After all, is this not exactly what 
Congress intended when it passed the SRA and created the mandatory 
sentencing Guidelines?  Even though the Guidelines are now advisory, as a 
result of the Rita presumption of reasonableness, the D.C. Circuit observed, 
“judges are more likely to sentence within the Guidelines in order to avoid 
the increased scrutiny that is likely to result from imposing a sentence outside 
the Guidelines.”230  In addition to the effect of the Rita presumption, the D.C. 
Circuit has also noted, “[p]ractically speaking, applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines provide a starting point or ‘anchor’ for judges and are likely to 
influence the sentences judges impose.”231  As one judge on the Eleventh 
 
225 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal 
System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 349 (2006) (noting that “the Booker decision appears to have 
only slightly mitigated the rigidity and severity of the federal sentencing system” and “data on 
post-Booker sentencing outcomes released by the Commission reveal only relatively small 
changes in the patterns of sentencing outcomes” (footnotes omitted)). 
226 Ryan W. Scott, Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 14 (2010). 
227 Id. (footnote omitted). 
228 Id. at 14–15 (footnotes omitted). 
229 Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 428 
(2011).  “The robust research on cognitive biases and framing effects suggests that judges do 
commit cognitive errors while sentencing and that sentencing baselines anchor sentences.”  Id. 
at 449. 
230 United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
231 Id.; see also United States v. Robertson, 662 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Turner and other cases); United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Turner); United States v. Doyle, 621 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351 (W.D. Va. 2009) (same); 
United States v. Kladek, 651 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996 (D. Minn. 2009) (same).  But see United 
States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193, 204–05 (4th Cir. 2010) (Goodwin, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting).  Chief Judge Joseph Goodwin of the Southern District of West Virginia criticized 
the majority for giving too much weight to the Turner anchoring language: “Relying upon the 
D.C. Circuit’s characterization of the Guidelines as an ‘important anchor for a sentencing 
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Circuit Court of Appeals has noted: “Not only have district courts now 
become used to relying on them, but the Guidelines inevitably have a 
considerable anchoring effect on a district court’s analysis.”232  Indeed, 
former Federal District Court Judge Nancy Gertner, after briefly mentioning 
the potential role of cognitive anchoring in federal sentencing, observed: “In 
effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides ready-made anchors.”233  
Gertner continued: “District judges have gotten the message.  Advisory or 
not, ‘compliance’ with the Guidelines is high.”234  Most recently, Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor, in dicta in her Peugh v. United States majority opinion,  
wrote: “The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve 
uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the 
Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the process 
of appellate review.”235  Just four days later, Judge Guido Calabresi wrote in 
a concurring opinion in United States v. Ingram,236 after citing to several of 
the “anchoring effect” studies described earlier: 
It is important to distinguish the guidelines’ intended, salutary effect—promoting 
consistency and proportionality in sentencing—from the unintended anchoring effect 
that the guidelines can exert.  Proper reliance on the guidelines is not only rational, but 
legally compelled.  As our court has stated, en banc, “sentencing judges, certainly, are 
not free to ignore the Guidelines. . . .  The Guidelines provide the starting point and the 
initial benchmark for sentencing, and district courts must remain cognizant of them 
throughout the sentencing process.”  Anchoring leads to cognitive error not insofar as 
judges intentionally use the guidelines in an advisory fashion, but instead when “judges 
irrationally assign too much weight to the guidelines range, just because it offers some 
initial numbers.”237 
It is sentencing judges’ extraordinarily difficult task to distinguish 
between Justice Sotomayor’s intended “anchoring” of the Guidelines and 
Judge Calabresi’s concern that the anchoring effect will lead to irrational and 
subconscious weighting of the Guidelines that calls out for a solution. 
 
judge,’ the majority necessarily concludes that the Guidelines are more of a requirement for 
district courts to follow than advice to be considered.”  Id. at 204 (quoting Turner, 548 F.3d 
at 1099).  The Turner majority thus gives more weight to the Guidelines than the Sixth 
Amendment permits. 
232 United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1105 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
233 Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006). 
234 Id. at 140. 
235 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (holding that a defendant sentenced under higher 
Guidelines than those in effect at the time of the offense violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
236 721 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2013). 
237 Id. at 40 n.2 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 
189 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Scott, supra note 226, at 45). 
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For federal district court judges with twenty-six years or fewer years of 
experience on the bench (75% of all sitting federal district court judges), the 
Guidelines have been with them their entire judicial career.238  Is it any 
wonder they remain anchored to them?239  Even the structure of the PSR 
promotes anchoring to the Guidelines range.  In either the traditional PSR or 
the newer version increasingly used by most courts,240 the computation of the 
Guidelines range is included in Part A of the PSR, “The Offense.”  The 
Guidelines calculation is preceded by only the cover page, which provides 
basic data about the defendant, like name, address, citizenship, the statement 
of the offense, and the offense conduct.  The calculation of the Guidelines 
range is followed by Part B of the PSR, which includes, in great detail, the 
defendant’s complete criminal history.  Part C includes all the offender 
characteristics, like personal and family data, physical condition, mental and 
emotional health, substance abuse, educational, vocational, and special skills, 
and financial condition—the grist for most of the § 3553(a) factors.  Part D 
includes sentencing options.  Thus, before a judge learns virtually anything 
about the defendant’s personal history and unique personal characteristics, 
the advisory Guidelines range forms an anchor for the sentence. 
When asked, federal district court judges have expressed considerable 
dissatisfaction with the Sentencing Guidelines.  A comprehensive survey of 
federal district court judges in 2010 by the USSC reported a plethora of 
criticism of the current Guidelines.  By way of a few examples, only 22% of 
judges surveyed strongly agreed “the federal sentencing guidelines have 
increased fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing.”241  Sixty-six 
percent of the judges surveyed thought that the “safety valve” in drug cases 
was too limited and should be expanded to offenders with two or three 
criminal history points.242  Sixty-nine percent of the judges surveyed thought 
that the safety valve should be expanded to all offenses with a mandatory 
minimum.243  Seventy-one percent of the judges surveyed disagreed with the 
lack of safety valve status for receipt of child pornography.244  Eighty-four 
 
238 There are 1,043 sitting federal district court judges: 606 are on active status, and 437 
are on senior status.  Of the sitting judges, 794 judges (574 active and 220 senior) were 
appointed after the effective date of the Guidelines, November 1, 1987.  See Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://goo.gl/Bw0lL4 (follow 
“Select research categories” hyperlink) (last visited May 22, 2014). 
239 But see Scott, supra note 226, at 42–44. 
240 The newer version is known as “PACTS v.6.0/PSX.”  PACTS stands for Probation and 
Pretrial Services Case Management Software. 
241 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, at tbl.17 (2010). 
242 Id. at tbl.2. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
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percent of the judges surveyed disagreed with considering acquitted conduct 
as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.245  Sixty-eight percent of the 
judges surveyed disagreed that uncharged conduct only referenced in the PSR 
could be considered relevant conduct.246  More than half of the judges 
surveyed thought that the Guidelines should be amended to allow judges to 
reduce a defendant’s sentence for substantial assistance, even if the 
Government does not make a motion.247 
When asked if certain factors were relevant to variances from the 
Guidelines, 60% or more of the judges responded that the following factors 
were ordinarily relevant: age, mental condition, emotional condition, 
physical condition, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, 
stress related to military service, civic, charitable or public service, prior good 
works, diminished capacity, voluntary disclosure of the offense, aberrant 
behavior, exceptional efforts to fulfill restitution obligations, and undue 
influence related to affection, relationship, or fear of other offenders.248  This 
is significant because the vast majority of these factors were not available for 
judges to consider prior to Booker unless they were present to an 
extraordinary degree.  Furthermore, federal district court judges have wide 
latitude and discretion to determine how much weight to give any of the 
§ 3553(a) factors and to attach greater weight to one factor over others.249  
However, as Figures 7 and 8 illustrate, judges do not now use these 
discretionary factors, each part of the § 3553(a) non-Guidelines factors, to 
any meaningful extent to reduce sentences.  This strongly suggests that the 
Guidelines act as a powerful anchor in current federal judicial sentencing. 
In addition to the USSC survey, federal judges have strongly criticized 
the Guidelines in scholarly journals, indicating, for example, that the 
Guidelines “need substantial change, if not complete rejection”250 and 
 
245 Id. at tbl.5. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at tbl.15. 
248 Id. at tbl.13. 
249 United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636–39 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Gasaway, 684 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679–80 
(4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Busara, 551 F.3d 669, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2008). 
250 Myron H. Bright, Judge Gerald W. Heaney: A True Son of the Soil, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
1101, 1103 (1997) (“Today almost all federal judges agree that these guidelines need 
substantial change, if not complete rejection.”); see also Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 1 (claiming “virtually everyone 
who is associated with the federal justice system” deems the Guidelines a “dismal failure”); 
Hon. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 530, 539 (2007) (describing “robust judicial opposition to the 
Guidelines”); Hon. Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
261, 267 (2009) (commenting that district court judges “had overwhelmingly opposed the 
Guidelines”); Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 681 (2006) 
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“threaten to transform the venerable ritual of sentencing into a puppet 
theater . . . .”251  Indeed, federal judges in their judicial opinions have also 
had harsh words for the perceived injustices of the Guidelines, calling them: 
“unworkable,” “unfair,” “a prescription for injustice,” and “exceptionally 
harsh.”252  Even senators who voted for the Guidelines recognize these issues.  
Senator Orrin Hatch observed: “A lot of judges hate the sentencing 
guidelines; they hate the mandatory minimums.  I can understand 
why . . . .”253  Legal scholars have also noted that “[c]riticisms of the structure, 
content, and operation of the pre-Booker Guidelines are legion . . . .”254 
But, of course, not all within-Guidelines sentences can fairly be 
attributed to anchoring.  Scott, in attempting to minimize the anchoring effect 
of the Guidelines as an explanation for the continued strong and persistent 
tethering to the Guidelines post-Booker, has argued that “some judges 
actually agree with the Guidelines’ recommendations or consciously choose 
to impose within-range sentences for institutional reasons.”255  Certainly, that 
is true.  Some judges post-Booker likely impose Guidelines sentences more 
 
(“But not long after they were enacted, the Guidelines began to attract serious criticism, which 
became more vehement as years went by.  Many critics, especially federal judges, argued that 
the rigidity of the Guidelines prevented judges from sentencing defendants in accordance with 
the justice of the particular case.” (footnote omitted)). 
251 Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1263 (1997) (“[T]he Guidelines threaten to transform the venerable 
ritual of sentencing into a puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of 
persons, abstract entities to be defined by a chart, their concrete existence systematically 
ignored and thus nullified.”). 
252 See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 700 F.3d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 2012) (Bright, J., 
dissenting) (“Since their adoption in 1987, many of the federal sentencing guidelines have 
proven unworkable, unfair, and have filled our federal prisons with defendants serving 
undeserved lengthy sentences . . . .”); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 513 (6th Cir. 
1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Guidelines as “a prescription for injustice 
because district judges can no longer prevent the imposition of inappropriately harsh 
sentences”); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (“The positivist view [of the Sentencing Guidelines], applied unflinchingly to this 
case, commands the affirmance of prison sentences that are exceptionally harsh by the 
standards of the modern Western world, dictated by an accidental, unintended scheme of 
punishment nevertheless implied by the words (taken one by one) of the relevant 
enactments.”). 
253 Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3–4 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Judiciary). 
254 Berman, supra note 225, at 363.  Berman also observed that “[t]wo scholars recently 
summarized many of these sentiments, observing that the Guidelines ‘have been the subject 
of sustained criticism from judges, lawyers, scholars, and members of Congress, and a wide 
consensus has emerged that the Federal Guidelines have in many ways failed.’”  Id. at 363 
n.85 (quoting Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2005)). 
255 Scott, supra note 226, at 2. 
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often than others to promote uniformity.  Others weigh policy or potential 
policy disagreements with the Guidelines in determining how much weight, 
if any, to give them.  Some Guidelines, like the former 100:1 crack/powder 
cocaine Guideline, and to some extent the current 18:1 ratio, generate less 
gravitational pull.256  And then there are the child pornography Guidelines, 
recently derided by one scholar, “the new crack cocaine in the sentencing 
world.”257  Melissa Hamilton concludes that the child pornography Guideline 
“is nonsensical and incongruous with normal sentencing practices”; that it 
“fails to represent the Commission’s institutional abilities and has not 
incorporated the federal judiciary’s learned judgments on the reasonableness 
of sentencing for these crimes”; and that the “child pornography guideline 
recommends sentences that are extraordinarily disproportionate . . . .”258  And 
drug trafficking Guidelines are no more rational than the child pornography 
Guidelines.  In United States v. Diaz, Judge John Gleeson recently laid bare 
what not all judges realize: the drug trafficking Guidelines have been deeply 
flawed from the beginning and “are not based on empirical data and national 
experience . . . .”259  Given the widespread dissatisfaction among federal 
district judges with the Guidelines, judicial acceptance cannot possibly 
explain the extent of judges’ tethering to the Guidelines.  Moreover, Scott’s 
cursory minimization of the anchoring effects of the Guidelines undermines 
the strength of his argument.260 
 
256 See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that judges could 
vary from the 100:1 crack/powder Guidelines, even in a mine-run case based on a categorical 
policy disagreement); United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847 (N.D. Iowa 2011) 
(Bennett, J.) (continuing, after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 
2372, the categorical policy disagreement from the old 100:1 to the new 18:1 crack/powder 
ratio even in mine-run cases). 
257 Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Adjudication: Lessons from Child Pornography Policy 
Nullification, GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://goo.gl/7LIGls 
258 Id. at 62. 
259 United States v. Diaz, No. 11-CR-00821-2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 28, 2013). 
260 Scott, supra note 226, at 45–46.  Scott contends that the advisory Guidelines are 
supposed to serve as an anchor, and thus cognitive anchoring “seems strained.”  Id. at 45.  
Scott ignores and summarily dismisses the incredible body of cognitive anchoring research 
that Ryan barely mentions in passing, citing just one anchoring study.  Id. at 45 n.202.  
Moreover, Scott’s quote from Gall that the Guidelines should be the “starting point and the 
initial benchmark,” is taken completely out of context.  Id. at 19.  A fair reading of this quote 
is that the Gall Court described how the actual sentencing hearing is to be structured, not the 
judges’ presentencing hearing approach to the PSR and a preliminary sentencing range.  See 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007).  Scott’s argument that there are numerous 
other numerical anchors also ignores the actual sentencing process that happens in the real 
world where the Guidelines range in the PSR is virtually always the most powerful numerical 
anchor and, of course, the first and often only one to which the judge is exposed. 
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Indeed, the anchoring effect is so strong that even when people are told 
to ignore it in subsequent judgments, the effect remains powerful.261  More 
pernicious is that participants in anchoring studies deny that anchoring had 
an effect on their judgments when in fact “substantial anchoring effects were 
found.”262  Thus, even if judges become aware of how the Guidelines 
cognitively anchor their sentencing practices, they are likely to deny its 
existence in specific cases.  Cognitive research has outlined the conditions 
necessary to overcome the anchoring effect and for people to “avoid making 
contaminated judgments . . . .”263  These conditions are (1) “[p]eople must be 
aware that bias has occurred”; (2) “be motivated to correct the bias”; 
(3) “know the direction and magnitude of the bias”; and (4) “have sufficient 
control over their responses to be able to correct for the bias.”264  Because the 
anchoring effect “occur[s] unintentionally and outside of awareness,”265 
judges who become aware of it and are motivated to prevent it still have to 
determine “the direction and magnitude of the effect” to adjust for it.266  The 
purpose of the modest proposal below is to help achieve each of these 
conditions to avoid “contaminated” sentencing decisions subconsciously 
anchored by the advisory Guidelines. 
VI. A MODEST PROPOSAL 
The Court in Rita appropriately observed that “[t]he sentencing judge, 
as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the [PSR] and its 
interpretation of the Guidelines.”267  Gall followed with a more commanding 
and somewhat incorrect observation of Rita that “[a]s we explained in Rita, 
a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly 
calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”268  Importantly, how a judge 
“normally” or “should” begin a sentencing hearing says nothing about the 
order of the information presented in the PSR or how the judge should 
prepare for the sentencing hearing.  Based on my experience in reading over 
3,500 PSRs in four districts, spanning two circuits, the Guidelines 
calculations are always presented before most of the other § 3553(a) factors 
(often only “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” § 3553(a)(1), is 
presented before the calculated Guidelines range).  However, nothing in 
either Rita or Gall, Rule 32, or any decision I am aware of, requires either 
 
261 Wilson et al., supra note 43, at 400. 
262 Id. 




267 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). 
268 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (emphasis added). 
530 MARK W. BENNETT [Vol. 104 
that the PSR present the Guidelines calculations first before disclosing and 
discussing the other § 3553(a) factors, or that the sentencing judge review the 
Guidelines calculations prior to reviewing the other § 3553(a) factors.269 
I suggest that the sentencing judge should review and study the 
information in a PSR’s non-Guidelines § 3553(a) first.  While this approach 
would require a reversal of the traditional format of the order of information 
in the PSR, it is a matter of custom and practice and can easily be changed.  
Any judge may request that the order of information in the PSR be reversed.  
I strongly urge that this long-standing practice be reversed to lessen the 
anchoring effect of the Guidelines calculation.   
But there is more to my proposal.  If this is all that is done, the anchoring 
effect of the Guidelines would still be too robust and powerful.  The key to 
my proposal is that a sentencing judge, before reviewing the Guidelines 
calculations, first review the non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and determine 
a preliminary sentencing range without exposure to the Guidelines range 
computed in the PSR.  Thus, the judge would first examine all but the 
advisory Guidelines range, as the Court described the § 3553(a) factors in 
Rita.  The judge would look at: 
(1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic 
aims of sentencing, namely, (a) “just punishment” (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) 
incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing 
Guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution.270 
Under this proposal, the judge would carefully examine all of the above 
factors, except factors 4 and 5, and then determine a tentative sentencing 
range untethered from the advisory Guidelines.  Once the tentative 
sentencing range is developed, the judge would then examine the PSR’s 
calculated advisory Guidelines range and any relevant Guidelines policy 
statements.  The tentative sentence would then be adjusted based on the 
weight the judge believes the Guidelines should be given among all the other 
§ 3553(a) factors.  This would all be done as preparation prior to the 
sentencing hearing.  At the sentencing hearing, the judge would then, of 
course, resolve any contested Guidelines issues, properly compute the 
Guidelines range if there were any objections in the PSR, hear any witness 
testimony, receive any exhibits, listen to the prosecution and defense’s 
sentencing arguments, and hear the defendant’s allocution, if any.  The judge 
would then pronounce the sentence.  This is all fully consistent with Gall. 
 
269 Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does list the calculation of the 
Guidelines as the first matter under Section (d), but the Rule does not require that the 
information be presented to the judge in the PSR prior to the other Section 3553(a) factors. 
270 Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–48. 
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Such a proposal differs substantially from the one proposed by Jelani 
Jefferson Exum.271  Exum proposes that federal judges be completely 
relieved from computing a Guidelines range.272  Exum suggests, “[i]f the 
Supreme Court would take the steps to do away with the Guidelines 
calculation requirement, then perhaps Congress could be prompted to revise 
the Guidelines so that they are still relevant to sentencing decisions.”273  I 
suppose the Tooth Fairy could also remove the Guidelines calculations from 
each PSR and leave the judge one dollar in its place.  The obvious problem 
with Exum’s suggestion is that it is impracticable and unrealistic because it 
requires both a substantial reversal of current law by the Supreme Court and 
favorable action by Congress that runs counter to the congressional intent in 
passing the SRA.  While I am deeply skeptical of Exum’s proposed solution, 
her article is excellent in identifying the anchoring problem with Guidelines 
calculations.  I wholeheartedly agree that “blind reliance on the properly 
calculated Guideline ranges as trustworthy anchors should be rethought.”274 
My proposal also differs, but less dramatically so, from Anne Traum’s 
proposal that to reduce the anchoring effect of the Guidelines, courts “should 
instead consider the Guidelines midstream in the § 3553(a) analysis,” which 
acknowledges that Traum’s “approach is not currently allowed under the 
Supreme Court’s decisions. . . .”275  Traum concludes that her approach is 
barred by the language in Gall that “[a]s a matter of administration and to 
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point 
and the initial benchmark.”276  Traum’s analysis brings to mind the Albert 
Einstein quote: “In theory, theory and practice are the same.  In practice, they 
are not.”277  As previously discussed, the Court in Gall was referring to the 
actual sentencing hearing, not how judges arrive at a tentative sentence in 
preparation for the sentencing hearing. 
My modest proposal would have little impact on the process of 
sentencing, but a significant salutary effect on the sentence.  I am confident 
most judges already formulate a tentative sentence after reading and 
pondering the PSR, but prior to the sentencing hearing.  That tentative 
sentence, however, is anchored by judge exposure to the Guidelines range 
 
271 Exum, supra note 14. 
272 Id. at 148. 
273 Id. at 150. 
274 Id. at 146. 
275 Traum, supra note 14, at 463. 
276 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); Traum, supra note 14, at 441–46. 
277 James S. Wallace, Value(s)-Based Management: Corporate Social Responsibility 
Meets Value-Based Management, in THE DRUCKER DIFFERENCE: WHAT THE WORLD’S 
GREATEST MANAGEMENT THINKER MEANS TO TODAY’S BUSINESS LEADERS 47, 56 (Craig L. 
Pearce et al. eds., 2009) (noting that the quote “has been credited to both Albert Einstein and 
Yogi Berra”). 
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before the other § 3553(a) factors are considered.  Under my proposal, the 
judge would simply arrive at two tentative sentences—one before analyzing 
the Guidelines range and the other after considering it.  Judges would then at 
least know what they thought fair sentences would be independent of the 
Guidelines ranges.  This is critically important: 
Because anchor values ordinarily precede specific, individualized information, the 
anchoring bias suggests that the first items of information are likely to receive more 
consideration than information that appears later.  Although the order in which 
information is received should be irrelevant to decisions that rely on that information, 
the mind does not work this way.  First impressions are powerful influences on 
judgment and seem to provide the prism through which subsequent information is 
filtered.  Even when first impressions are erroneous, they continue to affect judgment 
long after they have been discredited.278 
My proposal would reduce the effect of Guidelines-range anchoring and 
result in fairer sentencing.  Additionally, to reduce and counteract the 
anchoring effect of the Guidelines in the PSR, other significant and useful 
sentencing numerical information should be included in the PSR before the 
Guidelines calculations and range appear.  This information could possibly 
include: 
1) The average sentencing for the offense imposed in the district, in 
all the districts within the circuit, and nationally, taking into 
account the defendant’s criminal history; 
2) The average frequency and extent of departures and variance for 
the offense in the district, in all the districts within the circuit, 
and nationally, taking into account the defendant’s criminal 
history; 
3) The average pre-Guidelines sentence for the offense; and/or 
4) Recidivism data for the offense and criminal history obtained 
from the USSC. 
I suggest that this additional data should be used in the same manner as 
the core of my proposal—disclosed in the PSR only after the other non-
numeric information is considered and the judge has formulated a 
preliminary sentencing range untethered from anchoring effect of the 
Guidelines or this new numerical information. 
For this proposal to be accepted, judges would have to overcome their 
blind spot bias and overcome “the operation of bias in human judgment—
except when that bias is their own.”279  In terms of recognizing cognitive 
biases, it is important for judges to constantly doubt and reevaluate their own 
 
278 Prentice & Koehler, supra note 18, at 603–04 (footnotes omitted). 
279 Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2006). 
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objectivity.280  It is particularly important given that judges tend to 
overestimate their abilities to avoid biases in their own decisionmaking.  By 
way of example, one study found that 97% of judges (thirty-five out of thirty-
six) scored themselves in the top half of that group in “avoid[ing] racial 
prejudice in decisionmaking.”281  This is not mathematically possible.  So 
judges must be willing to recognize the anchoring effect, acknowledge that it 
does not only occur with other judges, and be motivated to correct the bias.  
Because the recent scientific evidence is so strong that our “blind spot” 
creates a pervasive tendency to see bias in others but not in ourselves,282 I am 
optimistic that once judges understand this, they will seek to overcome both 
the anchoring effect and their blind spot biases. 
CONCLUSION 
Well-established principles of cognitive bias, known as the “anchoring 
effect,” undermine judgments.  That is, exposure to a numerical “anchor” 
undermines the soundness of subsequent judgments by anchoring those 
judgments to that numerical anchor.  The history and breadth of cognitive 
psychological studies demonstrates that the powerful nature of anchoring on 
subsequent judgments occurs in all contexts of judgment.  Amazingly, the 
anchoring effect skews judgments even when the anchor is incomplete, 
inaccurate, irrelevant, implausible, and even random.  Anchoring studies 
involving judges establish that judges are as susceptible as anyone to the 
anchoring effect.  These studies also show that judges are not insulated from 
the effect by their specialization and expertise.  Additionally, judges are 
equally affected by another cognitive bias—the blind spot bias—which 
allows them to see bias in others but not in themselves.  This creates a double 
bind for sentencing judges who subconsciously increase sentences as a result 
of anchoring effects.  Even when judges are made aware of the effect of 
anchoring, they are unable to recognize it in their sentences.  The dramatic 
federal sentencing revolution of the last quarter century, which led to the 
current substantially increased sentencing discretion of federal judges 
unparalleled since the Sentencing Reform Act went into effect in 1987, has 
not had much effect on the length of federal sentences. 
Comprehensive data from the USSC establishes that the new discretion 
has, for the most part, had a surprisingly limited impact on federal sentencing.  
This is due primarily to the robust anchoring impact of first computing the 
advisory Guidelines sentencing range before considering the other non-
 
280 Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1124, 1172–73 (2012). 
281 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009). 
282 Ehrlinger et al., supra note 4, at 681. 
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numerical § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  This impact can be eliminated, or at 
least substantially reduced with a modest, but important change that, unlike 
other proposals, requires no shift or backtracking by the Supreme Court or 
new legislation from Congress.  This modest proposal suggests that federal 
district court judges first review all the important non-Guidelines sentencing 
factors contained in § 3553(a) and formulate a tentative sentence before 
reviewing the advisory Guidelines range and getting subjected to its potential 
powerful anchoring effect.  Once a judge formulates a tentative sentencing 
range uninfluenced by the anchoring effect of the advisory Guidelines range, 
the judge should then consider what weight to give the advisory Guidelines 
range in determining the ultimate sentence.  In the end, increasing federal 
district court judges’ knowledge of the powerful potential anchoring effect in 
sentencing, coupled with a greater understanding of the blind spot bias, 
should ensure fairer sentencing.  This is true independent of my proposal. 
